



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

REGION IV

345 COURTLAND STREET, N.E.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30365

AUG 28 1990

4APT-AEB

Mr. C. H. Fancy, P.E., Chief
Bureau of Air Regulation
Florida Department of Environmental Regulation
2600 Blair Stone Road
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400

Re: General Portland Cement

Dear Mr. Fancy:

This is in response to your June 28, 1990, letter requesting EPA's position on General Portland Cement's plans to restart an existing cement kiln (No. 6 kiln). Your letter requested that we discuss the applicable regulatory requirements for this project. Our comments are as follows:

PSD Applicability

The question here is whether the shutdown of the No. 6 kiln was intended to be permanent. If the shutdown was intended to be permanent, PSD and/or the nonattainment NSR rules would apply upon its reopening. Enclosed, please find a copy of the September 6, 1978, memorandum from Edward E. Reich addressing the issue. Because the No. 6 kiln has been partially dismantled and the pollution control device removed, it appears that the shutdown was intended to be permanent. Also, the shutdown has lasted over two years. Without a strong showing by the Company that the shutdown was not intended to be permanent, we would conclude that the reopening of the No. 6 kiln constitutes a new source.

Regarding the possible cogeneration facility, a determination must be made as to whether the cogeneration unit is a separate "facility" as defined in the State's PSD rules. Your letter does not provide the information necessary for making this finding. In short, the cogeneration facility must meet all three of the following provisions in order to be considered within the same "facility" as the cement plant:

- 1) The cogeneration facility and cement plant must be under common control;
- 2) The cogeneration facility and cement plant must be located on one or more contiguous or adjacent properties; and
- 3) The cogeneration facility must belong to the same industrial grouping as the cement plant. This can be determined based on the ratio of the fuels used to create electricity and/or steam for an outside party and the fuels used to create electricity/steam for the cement plant. The cogeneration facility should be classified in the grouping that relies most heavily on the fuel input.

RECEIVED
AUG 28 1990
DER-BAQM

NSPS Applicability

We have determined that the No. 6 kiln will be subject to 40 C.F.R. Part 60, Subpart F after renovation due to a modification as defined in 40 C.F.R. §60.14(a). Modification under NSPS incorporates the concept of two tests, namely there must be: 1) a physical or operational change to the existing facility and 2) an increase to the atmosphere of a regulated pollutant.

Currently the No. 6 kiln can not be operated because of the removal of equipment and, therefore, has no capacity. The addition of new (or used) equipment so that the No. 6 kiln can operate is considered a physical change.


In order to determine if there is an emissions increase due to a physical change, a comparison between the emission rate at the current actual maximum capacity to the emission rate after the physical change must be made. The emission rate before physical change is based upon the operational condition of the existing facility just prior to the physical change. Since the No. 6 kiln is currently considered not operational, there will obviously be an increase in the emission rate of a regulated pollutant (particulate matter).

We believe that the above determination is consistent with the Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCO) decision (enclosed).

If General Portland decides to install an existing boiler at the site, NSPS should not apply provided that the boiler has not been modified or reconstructed as defined in §60.14 or §60.15, respectively.

If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Mr. Brian Beals at (404) 347-2904.

Sincerely,



Jewell A. Harper, Chief
Air Enforcement Branch
Air, Pesticides and Toxics
Management Division

Enclosures



MEMORANDUM FROM DVORKIN
DATED JUNE 29, 1978.
QUESTIONS REPRODUCED BELOW.

3.14

67

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460

SEP 6 1978

OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: PSD Requirements

FROM: Director
Division of Stationary Source Enforcement

TO: Stephen A. Dvorkin, Chief
General Enforcement Branch
Region II

In response to your memo dated June 29, 1978, we have consulted with the Offices of General Counsel and Air Quality Planning and Standards and provide the following responses to your questions regarding the applicability of several PSD requirements.

Q - 1(a). Is a source which shut down approximately four years ago because of an industrial accident, and which was not and is not required to obtain a permit under a SIP, subject to the requirements of PSD? This source was not subject to PSD requirements prior to March 1, 1978.

A - This is a question which we have not previously addressed, but we believe that EPA policy should be as follows. A source which had been shut down would be a new source for PSD purposes upon reopening if the shutdown was permanent. Conversely, it would not be a new source if the shutdown was not permanent. Whether a shutdown was permanent depends upon the intention of the owner or operator at the time of the shutdown as determined from all the facts and circumstances, including the cause of the shutdown and the handling of the shutdown by the State. A shutdown lasting for two years or more, or resulting in removal of the source from the emissions inventory of the State, should be presumed permanent. The owner or operator proposing to reopen the source would have the burden of showing that the shutdown was not permanent,

CONCURRENCES - BIANCHI, ALBERICO, ROCHLIN, SMITH,
PROTHRO, WYCKOFF, JAMES, SIGNED BY REICH

and of overcoming any presumption that it was. Under the facts you have given us, we would presume that the shutdown was permanent, since it has already lasted about four years. Consequently, unless the owner or operator of the source were to rebut that presumption, we would treat the source as a new source for PSD purposes.

We assume that your statement that the source was not subject to the PSD regulations in effect before March 1, 1978, means that it was not in one of the nineteen source categories listed in Section 52.21(d)(1) of those regulations. A proposed new source which was not in one of those categories would be subject to the PSD regulations promulgated on June 19, 1978, unless (1) all required SIP permits had been obtained by March 1, 1978, and (2) construction commences before March 19, 1979, is not discontinued for 18 months or more and is completed within a reasonable time. See §52.21(i)(3), 43 FR 26406. Here, all required SIP permits were obtained by March 1, since none was required. Consequently, the source would not be subject to the new regulations, assuming that the reopening is commenced before March 19, 1979, is not discontinued for more than 18 months and is completed within a reasonable time.

If we were to treat the source as an existing source for PSD purposes, we would also conclude that it is not subject to the new regulations. No source on which construction commenced before June 1, 1975, would be subject to those regulations.¹ See Clean Air Act §§168(b), 169(4); 40 CFR 52.21(d)(1) (1977). Here, since the source was in operation about 4 years ago, construction on it presumably commenced before then, well before June 1, 1975. Hence, it would (presumably) not be subject to the new regulations.

Q - 1(b). Would your answer to 1.a., above, change if the source is or was required to obtain a SIP permit?

A - If the source shut down temporarily, it would not be required to obtain a PSD permit in order to start up.

¹Application of this rule requires special guidance for multifacility sources which construct in phases. Generally, if one phase of a multifacility source commenced construction by June 1, 1975, all other mutually dependent phases specifically approved for construction at the same time will also be "grandfathered". On the other hand, each independent facility must have commenced construction individually by June 1, 1975, to have achieved grandfather status. See 43 FR 26396, 19 June 1978.

On the other hand, if the source shut down permanently, it would, upon reopening, be required to obtain a PSD permit unless the following two conditions were met: 1) the SIP permit was obtained prior to 3/1/78 and 2) any construction necessary for reopening is commenced prior to 3/19/79, is not discontinued for 18 months or more and is completed within a reasonable time.

Q - 2. Is the EPA required in all cases to forebear from issuing a PSD permit until a SIP permit has been issued or is such forbearance required only when the source is subject to the "Interpretative Ruling" (41 FR 55524, December 21, 1976)?

A - EPA should refrain from issuing a PSD permit prior to issuance of a SIP permit only in cases where the source is also subject to the Interpretative Ruling. (See 43 FR 26402, column 3.)

Q - 3. In the evaluation of BACT, does equipment reliability play a part, i.e., should a unit capable of 80% control with a 20% downtime, be preferred to a unit capable of 90% control with a 35% downtime? Can backup equipment be required for BACT purposes?

A - Questions concerning BACT should be addressed to the Control Programs Development Division in Durham, N.C.

Q - 4. For the purpose of determining what constitutes "air pollution control equipment," what is meant by the phrase ". . . normal product of the source or its normal operation"? (43 FR 26392, mid. col., June 19, 1978). Does that refer to the quantity or quality of the product or both, i.e., if a baghouse collects 100% of the product, a settling chamber collects 20%, and without some device no product is collected, what is deemed to be "air pollution control equipment"?

A - If a source (such as one which produces zinc-oxide) cannot capture any of its product without the use of some type of control device, the least efficient control device used in the industry will be considered vital to the process. For example, if sources in such an industry typically employ either settling chambers or baghouses, potential emissions will be calculated as the emissions from such a source with a settling chamber installed.

Q - 5. Do the provisions of Section 167 of the Clean Air Act, which refer to issuance of an Order and seeking injunctive relief for PSD violations, create enforcement authorities independent of those created in Section 113 for SIP violations, or do they simply incorporate Section 113 by reference?

A - We believe that Section 167 provides the Agency

with enforcement authority which is not necessarily otherwise provided by Section 113. The Office of Enforcement is drafting guidance on implementation of Section 167. This guidance should be completed shortly. In the interim, the Agency should enforce against violations of the PSD requirements under the mechanisms established by Section 113, generally. There is one important situation, however, in which resort to Section 167 may be necessary. This would occur when a state had issued a permit that EPA considered to be invalid. In this situation, we believe that Section 167 provides the Agency with the authority to halt the construction of the source directly, without first having to resort to the cumbersome process of seeking a judicial declaration that the state permit is invalid. (See 42 FR 57473 (1977)). In this respect, Section 167 provides the agency with authority similar to that provided by section 113(a)(5) and (b)(5) to prevent sources with invalid permits from constructing in nonattainment areas. Please note, however, that no delegations for enforcement of the PSD requirements have been signed yet, and so any action under §167 would have to be taken in close coordination with DSSE, and any §167 orders would have to be signed by the Administrator.

If you have any further questions on these issues, please contact Libby Scopino at FTS 755-2564.



Edward E. Reich

APPENDIX—Continued

The government proffers an analysis of personal jurisdiction versus subject matter jurisdiction in support of its argument that despite the procedural nullity of the grand jury, the indictment was nonetheless valid. This argument is unavailing because it fails to account for the evidence before the district court in light of the *Taylor* remand. Therefore, other arguments and citations proffered by the government need not be discussed.

II.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.⁶

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER
COMPANY, Petitioner,

v.

William K. REILLY, Administrator and
United States Environmental Protection
Agency, Respondents.

Nos. 88-3264, 89-1339.

United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 15, 1989.

Decided Jan. 19, 1990.

Power company challenged final determinations of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), concluding that proposed renovations to electric power plant would subject plant to "new source performance standards" and "prevention of serious deterioration" standards of Clean Air Act. The Court of Appeals, Cudahy, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) renovations to power plant, which included replacement of rear steam drums and air heaters, constituted "physi-

cal change," for purpose of determining whether renovation constituted "modification" which would subject plant to "new source performance standards"; (2) EPA properly considered increase in life expectancy of plant, and cost, nature and magnitude of project, when determining whether renovation was "routine" modification, within exception in EPA regulations to applicability of "new source performance standards"; (3) EPA's refusal to compare representative prerenovation emissions with actual postrenovation emissions, for purpose of determining whether there was modification which would subject plant to "new source performance standards," was not arbitrary or capricious; (4) EPA improperly relied on assumed continuous operations as basis for finding emissions increase which would subject plant after renovation to "prevention of serious deterioration" standards; and (5) EPA properly refused to permit power company to utilize lower sulfur coal instead of implementing pollution control technologies to prevent increase in emissions.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

1. Health and Environment ⇨25.15(9)

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) does not have unbridled discretion to construe Clean Air Act Amendments free from judicial oversight, but instead Court of Appeals must consider whether EPA's construction comports with its statutory mandate and Congress' intent in enacting clean air legislation. Clean Air Act, § 101 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 et seq.

2. Statutes ⇨219(1)

Principle of deference to administrative agency's interpretation of statute has particular force where subject being regulated is technical and complex.

3. Health and Environment ⇨25.6(3)

Physical changes to power plant will constitute "modification," which will subject plant to "new source performance

6. We note that on September 12, 1988, the Special April 1987 Grand Jury reindicted Clemenic

so that our decision will not result in a miscarriage of justice.

—Continued

jections based on de-
nent or information
fails to show jur-
rt or to charge an
ctions shall be no-
at any time during
e proceedings);

) (1986) (emphasis
c raised the issue of
uted grand jury as
received notification
s Attorney's Office.

4. Accordingly, the
considered at that
ourt.

ot agree with the
ailure to extend the
was harmless error.
ges that in view of
verdict in this case,
jury's extension was
defendant counters,
not confer power on
outset. The validity
conviction judgment
t having jurisdiction
matter and the party.
eland, Ltd. v. Com-
le Guinee, 456 U.S.
99, 2103, 72 L.Ed.2d
onal error cannot be
armless error. See
2d 223, 226 n. 3 (7th

urt agreed that the
m of the grand jury
error in light of
conviction if the is-
onal one. But since
84 Grand Jury had
ended at the time it
eked the authority to
ndictment was a nul-
guilty verdict was
ed that unless there
ck of a valid indict-
is a defect going to
e court. *Smith v.*
. 1, 10, 79 S.Ct. 991.
Therefore, the dis-
eid it was without
sentence Clemenic.

standards" under Clean Air Act, only if there is both a physical change and increase in emissions. Clean Air Act, § 111(a)(2, 4), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(a)(2, 4).

See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.

4. Health and Environment ⇨25.6(3)

Power company's replacement program for electric power plant constituted "physical change," within definition of a "modification" which will subject power plant to "new source performance standards" under Clean Air Act, where power company proposed to replace rear steam drums and air heaters. Clean Air Act, § 111(a)(2, 4), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(a)(2, 4).

See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.

5. Health and Environment ⇨25.6(7)

Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) characterization of power company's replacement program for electric power plant as "non-routine," for purposes of exception in EPA's regulations to "new source performance standards" under Clean Air Act for "routine" modifications, was not inconsistent with EPA's prior ruling that other utilities' replacement of 40 air heaters was "routine." Clean Air Act, § 111(a)(2, 4), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(a)(2, 4).

See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.

6. Health and Environment ⇨25.6(7)

Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) conclusion that proposed replacement of rear steam drums and air heaters electric power plant would increase life expectancy of facility, and EPA's consideration of life expectancy when determining whether project was "routine" modification, within meaning of EPA regulation exempting "routine" modifications from "new source performance standards" under Clean Air Act, was not arbitrary and

capricious. Clean Air Act, § 111(a)(2, 4), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(a)(2, 4).

7. Health and Environment ⇨25.6(3)

Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) reconstruction rule, which considers cost, nature and magnitude of project when determining if reconstruction project is subject to "new source performance standards" under Clean Air Act, did not preclude EPA's examination of such factors when determining applicability of its regulations exempting "routine" modifications from "new source performance standards." Clean Air Act, § 111(a)(2, 4), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(a)(2, 4).

8. Health and Environment ⇨25.6(3)

Environmental Protection Agency properly used figures for certain year when determining emissions baseline of electric power plant, for purpose of further determining whether plant was subject to "new source performance standards" under Clean Air Act, where choice of figures from that year was based entirely upon power company's own data. Clean Air Act, § 111(a)(2, 4), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(a)(2, 4).

9. Health and Environment ⇨25.6(3)

"Representative performance of the facility," within meaning of Environmental Protection Agency regulations requiring that manual emission tests and continuous monitoring systems be based upon "representative performance of the facility" when determining applicability to power plant of "new source performance standards" under Clean Air Act, refers generally to all conditions of test, not specifically to its timing. Clean Air Act, § 111(a)(4), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(a)(4).

See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.

10. Health and Environment ⇨25.6(3)

For purposes of determining applicability of "new source performance standards" under Clean Air Act to renovated electric power plant, Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) refusal to compare representative preremodification emissions with actual postremodification emissions was not con-

trary to EPA's regulations. Clean Air Act, § 111(a)(2, 4), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(a)(2, 4).

11. Health and Environment ⇨25.6(7)

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) properly refused to apply "production rate/hours of operation" exclusion in EPA regulations when determining whether renovation of electric power plant constituted "modification" which would subject plan to "prevention of serious deterioration" measurements under Clean Air Act, as exception was provided to allow facilities to take advantage of fluctuating market conditions, not construction or modification activity. Clean Air Act, §§ 165(a)(1), 169(2)(C), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(C).

12. Health and Environment ⇨25.6(3)

Environmental Protection Agency improperly invoked "potential to emit" concept in calculating emissions increase following renovations to electric power plant, for purpose of determining applicability to power plant of "prevention of serious deterioration" measurements under Clean Air Act. Clean Air Act, §§ 165(a)(1), 169(2)(C), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(C).

13. Health and Environment ⇨25.6(3)

For purpose of determining whether renovation of electric power plant constituted modification which would subject power plant to "prevention of serious deterioration" measurements under Clean Air Act, power company's ability to avoid Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) presumption of continuous operation of plant simply by consenting to federally enforceable emissions limits did not justify EPA's presumption of continuous operation if utility refused to consent. Clean Air Act, §§ 165(a)(1), 169(2)(C), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(C).

14. Health and Environment ⇨25.6(3)

Environmental Protection Agency could not rely on assumed continuous operation of electric power plant subsequent to renovation as basis for finding emissions increase, and disregarding past operating conditions at plant, when determining

whether renovation constituted modification which would subject power plant to "prevention of serious deterioration" measurements under Clean Air Act. Clean Air Act, §§ 165(a)(1), 169(2)(C), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(C).

15. Health and Environment ⇨25.6(5)

Power company could not utilize lower sulfur coal instead of implementing pollution control technologies to prevent increase in emissions, and thus prevent application of "new source performance standards" under Clean Air Act. Clean Air Act, § 111(a)(2, 4), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(a)(2, 4).

Henry V. Nickel (argued), Mel S. Schulze, Hunton & Williams, Washington, D.C., Walter T. Woelfle, Milwaukee, Wis., for petitioner.

Richard L. Thornburg, U.S. Atty. Gen., Washington, D.C., Eileen T. McDonough, Dept. of Justice, Land & Natural Resources Div., Washington, D.C., Deborah D. Djeu, Gregory B. Foote, Environmental Protection Agency (argued), Chicago, Ill., Lawrence J. Jensen, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., Michael A. McCord, Dept. of Justice, Land & Natural Resources Div., Washington, D.C., for respondents.

David G. Walsh, Foley & Lardner, Madison, Wis., for Wisconsin Utilities Ass'n, Inc., amicus curiae.

F. William Brownell, Norman W. Fichtorn, Hunton & Williams, Washington, D.C., for Alabama Power Co., amicus curiae.

Jeffrey S. Holik, Baker & Hostetler, Washington, D.C., for Aluminum Ass'n, Inc., amicus curiae.

Barton C. Green, Washington, D.C., for American Iron and Steel Institute, amicus curiae.

G. William Frick, Washington, D.C., for American Petroleum Institute, amicus curiae.

William E. Hynan, Washington, D.C., for National Coal Ass'n, amicus curiae.

Edward P. Giblin, Jr., Gaithersburg, Md., for Bechtel Power Corp., amicus curiae.

Paul J. Lambert, Bingham, Dana & Gould, Washington, D.C., for General Elec. Credit Corp., amicus curiae.

Carol L. Dalcanton, Pittsburgh, Pa., for Westinghouse Elec. Corp., amicus curiae.

Russell S. Frye, Chadbourne & Parke, Matthew B. VanHook, Washington, D.C., for American Paper Institute, Inc., amicus curiae.

Before CUDAHY and FLAUM, Circuit Judges, and GRANT, Senior District Judge.*

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.

The Petitioner, Wisconsin Electric Power Company ("WEPCO"), challenges two final determinations issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA"). In these determinations, the EPA concluded that WEPCO's proposed renovations to its Port Washington power plant would subject the plant to certain pollution control provisions of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 *et seq.* (1982). We affirm in part, vacate in part and remand to the EPA.

I. The Underlying Dispute

A. Relevant Provisions of the Clean Air Act

Some discussion of the Clean Air Act is required before turning to the merits of this case. In 1970, Congress enacted the Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub.L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, to establish minimum air quality standards that would regulate the emission of certain pollutants into the atmosphere. To this end, Congress instructed the EPA to develop National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") that would specify the maximum permissible concentration of air pollutants in different areas across the country.

In section 111 of the 1970 Amendments, Congress required the EPA to promulgate

New Source Performance Standards ("NSPS") in order to regulate the emission of air pollutants from new sources. These standards addressed hourly rates of emission and, in addition to new sources, applied to modifications of existing facilities that created new or increased pollution. Indeed, section 111(a)(2) of the Act stated that NSPS would apply to

any stationary source, the construction or modification of which is commenced after the publication of regulations (or, if earlier, proposed regulations) prescribing a standard of performance under this section which will be applicable to such source.

42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2) (emphasis supplied). Congress then defined "modification" as *any physical change in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary source which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source or which results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted.*

42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (emphasis supplied).

Subsequently, faced with only varying degrees of success in controlling pollution in different parts of the country, Congress enacted the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub.L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982)). Congress revised the NSPS so that regulated sources of pollution would have to use "the best system of continuous emission reduction which (taking into consideration the costs of achieving such emission reduction, and any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated...." 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)(C). In addition, Congress added a program for the Prevention of Significant Deterioration ("PSD"), concerned with increases in total annual emissions, to ensure that operators of regulated sources in relatively unpolluted areas would not allow a decline of air quality to the minimum level permitted by NAAQS. Air quality is preserved in this program by

sitting by designation.

* The Honorable Robert A. Grant, Senior District Judge for the Northern District of Indiana, is

requiring sources to limit their emissions to a "baseline rate"; regulated owners or operators in areas that have attained NAAQS must obtain a permit before constructing or modifying facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(1). Congress also essentially adopted its NSPS definition of "modification" for the PSD program. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(C).

From this statutory framework, the EPA promulgated regulations for both the NSPS and PSD programs. In this case, its regulations concerning modifications are central. The EPA defines "modification" in substantially the same terms used by Congress:

[A]ny physical or operational change to an existing facility which results in an increase in the emission rate to the atmosphere of any pollutant to which a standard applies shall be considered a modification within the meaning of section 111 [42 U.S.C. § 7411] of the Act.

40 C.F.R. § 60.14(a) (1988). To determine whether a physical change constitutes a modification for purposes of NSPS, the EPA must determine whether the change increases the facility's *hourly rate* of emission. 40 C.F.R. § 60.14 (1988). For PSD purposes, current EPA regulations provide that an increase in the *total amount* of emissions activates the modification provisions of the regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(3) (1988).

Even at first blush, the potential reach of these modification provisions is apparent: the most trivial activities—the replacement of leaky pipes, for example—may trigger the modification provisions if the change results in an increase in the emissions of a facility. As a result, the EPA promulgated specific exceptions to the modification provisions:

The following shall not, by themselves, be considered modifications under this part:

(1) Maintenance, repair, and replacement which the Administrator deter-

1. Air heaters preheat combustion air to improve the efficiency of the steam generating units. *Steam: Its Generation and Use* 13-4 (1978) (Bab-

cock & Wilcox). Steam drums separate saturated steam from water within the boiler. *Id.* at 1-5.

mines to be routine for a source category ...
(2) An increase in production rate of an existing facility, if that increase can be accomplished without a capital expenditure on that facility.

(3) An increase in the hours of operation....

40 C.F.R. § 60.14(e) (1988) (NSPS program); see 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(iii) (1988) (PSD program). These regulations (and the statutes from which they derive) are the focal point of this case.

B. WEPCO's Proposed Life-Extension Project

WEPCO's Port Washington electric power plant is located on Lake Michigan north of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The plant consists of five coal-fired steam generating units that were placed in operation between 1935 and 1950. Each generating unit has a design capacity of 80 megawatts, but the recent performance of some of the units has declined due to age-related deterioration of the physical plant.

WEPCO and its consultant, Bechtel Eastern Power Corporation, conducted a Plant Availability Study in 1983 to examine and assess the condition of the power plant. As a result of the Study, WEPCO concluded "that *extensive renovation* of the five units and the plant common facilities is needed if operation of the plant is to be continued." Letter from Thomas J. Cassidy, Executive Vice President of WEPCO, to Jacqueline K. Reynolds, Secretary to the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, at 2 (July 8, 1987) [Cassidy Letter] (emphasis supplied). The Study noted that the air heaters on the first four units had deteriorated severely, while the rear steam drums in units 2 through 5 had experienced serious cracking.¹ Air heater deterioration prevented units 1 and 4 from operating at full capacity, while the potential for steam drum blowout required a reduction in pressure (and output) in units 2 and 3. The possibility of catastrophic failure (steam

cock & Wilcox). Steam drums separate saturated steam from water within the boiler. *Id.* at 1-5.

drum blowout) in unit 5 was so great that WEPCO shut down the unit completely.

As a result of this Study, WEPCO submitted a proposed replacement program (which it termed a "life extension" project) to the Wisconsin Public Service Commission for its approval, as required by state law. Wis.Stat. § 196.49 (1987). WEPCO explained in its proposal that "[r]enovation is necessary to allow the Port Washington units to operate beyond their currently planned retirement dates of 1992 (units 1 and 2) and 1999 (units 3, 4 and 5) . . . [and that renovation would render the plant] capable of generating at its designed capability until year 2010. . . ." Cassidy Letter at 1-2. Among the renovations required were repair and replacement of the turbine-generators, boilers, mechanical and electrical auxiliaries and the common plant support facilities. *Id.* at 1. After preliminary review of the program, the Public Service Commission consulted the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (which then consulted EPA Region V) to determine whether WEPCO needed to obtain a PSD permit before commencing the repair and replacement program. David Kee, the Director of EPA Region V's Air and Radiation Division, then referred the matter to EPA Headquarters. *See, e.g.*, 40 C.F.R. § 60.5 (1988) (discussing the EPA's procedures regarding determinations of construction or modification).

EPA staff members conferred with WEPCO representatives between March and September 1988 to gain additional information regarding the proposed repair and replacement project. On September 9, 1988, EPA Acting Assistant Administrator Don R. Clay issued a memorandum in which he preliminarily concluded that the project would subject the plant to both NSPS and PSD requirements. Memorandum from Don R. Clay, Acting Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation of the EPA, to David A. Kee, Director of Air and Radiation Division, Region V (Sept. 9, 1988) [Clay Memorandum]. The Clay Memorandum pointed out that the project would constitute a "physical change" resulting in an increase of production and emissions, which would therefore subject the plant to

the relevant strictures of the Clean Air Act. *Id.* at 3-4. Further, the Clay Memorandum dismissed WEPCO's contention that the program was routine and was therefore exempt from the requirements of NSPS and PSD. This conclusion was adopted *in toto* by EPA Administrator Lee M. Thomas. Letter from Lee M. Thomas, Administrator of the EPA, to John Boston, Vice President of WEPCO (Oct. 14, 1988) [Thomas Letter].

Following the Thomas Letter, WEPCO continued to conduct capacity tests on the units. Based upon these tests, Assistant Administrator Clay issued a "revised final determination" that generally affirmed the EPA's earlier findings, but modified the baseline figures used by the EPA for units 2 and 3. Letter from Don R. Clay, Acting Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation of the EPA, to John W. Boston, Vice President of WEPCO (Feb. 15, 1989) [Supplemental Determination].

Alleging that the EPA has misconstrued both the Clean Air Act and its own regulations, WEPCO appeals the EPA's final determination. We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1982).

II. Standard of Review

Courts have generally accorded substantial deference to the EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air Act Amendments, reasoning that "considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer. . . ." *Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); *see Union Elec. Co. v. EPA*, 427 U.S. 246, 256, 96 S.Ct. 2518, 2525, 49 L.Ed.2d 474 (1976); *Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 421 U.S. 60, 75, 87, 95 S.Ct. 1470, 1479, 1485, 43 L.Ed.2d 731 (1975); *ASARCO Inc. v. EPA*, 578 F.2d 319, 325 (D.C.Cir.1978). This deference with regard to the Clean Air Act follows logically from the highly technical provisions of the Amendments, *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 848, 104 S.Ct. at 2784, and is consistent with the

Cite as 893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990)

Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that agency actions are to be set aside only if they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

[1] To be sure, this standard does not give the EPA unbridled discretion to construe the Clean Air Act Amendments free from judicial oversight. We must consider whether the EPA's construction comports with its statutory mandate and Congress's intent in enacting clean air legislation. But we cannot simply substitute our judgment for that of the EPA. Our role has been sharply defined and limited by the Supreme Court:

When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82 (footnotes omitted).

[2] Further, we defer even more to an agency's construction of its own regulations. *Lyng v. Payne*, 476 U.S. 926, 939, 106 S.Ct. 2333, 2341, 90 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986); see *Wilkins v. Sullivan*, 889 F.2d 135, 139 (7th Cir.1989); *Homemakers North Shore, Inc. v. Bowen*, 832 F.2d 408, 411 (7th Cir. 1987) (agency construction of its regulations usually upheld). An agency's interpretation must be upheld "unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." *Udall v. Tallman*, 380 U.S.

1, 16-17, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801-802, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965) (quoting, in part, *Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.*, 325 U.S. 410, 413-14, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945)). The principle of deference has particular force where, as is the case here, the subject being regulated is technical and complex. *Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist.*, 467 U.S. 380, 390, 104 S.Ct. 2472, 2479, 81 L.Ed.2d 301 (1984); *Wilkins v. Sullivan*, 889 F.2d at 140; see also *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 164, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944) (rulings of agency constitute bodies of experience and informed judgment).

III. Like-Kind Replacement and Modification under the Act

A. The Underlying Statutory Framework

[3] With these principles in mind, we may address the merits. We must first consider whether WEPCO's Port Washington replacement program constitutes a modification under the terms of the controlling statute, 42 U.S.C. section 7411(a)(4). Cf. *Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores*, 421 U.S. 723, 756, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 1935, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) ("The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself."). Section 7411(a)(4) defines modification as "any physical change . . . which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4). Both parts of this definition—any physical change and an increase in emissions—must be satisfied before a replacement will be considered a "modification."

1. Physical Change

[4] Certainly, under the plain terms of the Act, WEPCO's replacement program constitutes a "physical change." WEPCO proposes to replace rear steam drums on units 2, 3, 4 and 5; each of these steam drums measures 60 feet in length, 50.5 inches in diameter and 5.25 inches in thickness. Clay Memorandum at 4. In addition, WEPCO plans to replace another ma-

major component, the air heaters, in units 1-4. To implement this four-year program, WEPCO will need to make the replacements by taking the units successively out of service for nine-month periods. *Id.* These steps clearly amount to a "physical change" in the Port Washington plant. See Butler, *New Source Netting in Nonattainment Areas under the Clean Air Act*, 11 Ecology L.Q. 343, 349-50 (1984) ("[T]he new source review requirements are triggered not only when an operator builds a new plant, but also whenever the operator installs or alters a piece of equipment in an existing plant and thereby increases emissions.") (emphasis supplied).

WEPCO does not dispute that its steam drum and air heater replacements will result in an altered plant. But WEPCO does assert that Congress did not intend for simple equipment replacement to constitute a physical change for purposes of the Clean Air Act's modification provisions:

The plain meaning of "modify" is "to change or alter" [Webster's New World Dictionary] or "to make basic or fundamental changes in." [Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary] Reflecting the plain meaning of this term, Congress provided that a facility (1) must undergo a physical or operational "change" before it is evaluated under the modification provision. . . . Thus, under the plain meaning of the Act, a unit should not be deemed "modified" as a result of replacement of equipment with equipment similar to that replaced. As in the case of Port Washington, such like-kind replacement does not "change or alter" the design or nature of the facility. Rather, it merely allows the facility to operate again as it had before the specific equipment deteriorated.

Petitioner's Brief at 32-33.

Chevron instructs us to rely more on congressional direction and on agency construction (pursuant to congressional delegation) than on glosses found in the dictionary. What WEPCO calls "plain" is anything but plain and takes the definition far beyond the words enacted by Congress. *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 843-45, 104 S.Ct. at

2781-83; see generally, R. Anthony, *Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States: Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind the Courts and the Public?* (1989) (explaining *Chevron* approach). Thus, whether the replacement of air heaters and steam drums is a "basic or fundamental change" in the Port Washington plant is irrelevant for our purposes, given Congress's directions on the subject: "The term 'modification' means any physical change. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (emphasis supplied). We follow Congress's definition of "modification"—not Webster's—when interpreting this term within the context of the Clean Air Act. Cf. *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 861, 104 S.Ct. at 2790 ("[T]he meaning of a word must be ascertained in the context of achieving particular objectives. . . .").

Nor can we find any support in the relevant case law for the narrow constructions of "modification" and "physical change" offered by WEPCO. The Supreme Court reported in *Chevron* that Senator Muskie, one of the principal supporters of the Clean Air Act, remarked: "A source . . . is subject to all the nonattainment requirements as a modified source if it makes any physical change which increases the amount of any air pollutant. . . ." 467 U.S. at 853, 104 S.Ct. at 2787 (quoting 123 Cong.Rec. 26847 (1977)) (emphasis supplied). And other courts considering the modification provisions of NSPS and PSD have assumed that "any physical change" means precisely that. See, e.g., *National-Southwire Aluminum Co. v. EPA*, 838 F.2d 835 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 390, 102 L.Ed.2d 379 (1988) (turning off pollution control equipment constitutes "physical change" and modification); *Alabama Power Co. v. Costle*, 636 F.2d 323, 400 (D.C.Cir.1979) ("[T]he term 'modification' is nowhere limited to physical changes exceeding a certain magnitude."); *ASARCO Inc. v. EPA*, 578 F.2d 319, 322 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (NSPS applies to any stationary source that is "physically or operationally changed in such a way that its emission of any air pollutant increases.") (emphasis removed). Cf. *United States v. Narragansett Improvement Co.*, 571 F.Supp. 688,

694-95 (D.R.I.1983) (replacement program not modification because, despite physical change, no increase in emissions).

Further, to adopt WEPCO's definition of "physical change" would open vistas of indefinite immunity from the provisions of NSPS and PSD. Were we to hold that the replacement of major generating station systems—including steam drums and air heaters—does not constitute a physical change (and is therefore not a modification), the application of NSPS and PSD to important facilities might be postponed into the indefinite future. There is no reason to believe that such a result was intended by Congress. The Clean Air Act Amendments were enacted to "speed up, expand, and intensify the war against air pollution in the United States with a view to assuring that the air we breathe throughout the Nation is wholesome once again." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 1, *reprinted in* 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5356, 5356. In particular, the permit program established by the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act represented a balance between "the economic interests in permitting capital improvements to continue and the environmental interest in improving air quality." *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 851, 104 S.Ct. at 2786. The House echoed this theme in its Committee report: "[The compliance program is designed, in part,] to allow reasonable economic growth to continue in an area while making reasonable further progress to assure attainment of the [pollution-control] standards by a fixed date...." H.R.Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 211, *reprinted in* 1977 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1077, 1290. A too restrictive interpretation of "modification" might upset the economic-environmental balance in unintended ways.

Consistent with its balanced approach, Congress chose not to subject existing plants to the requirements of NSPS and PSD. Members of the House recognized that "[b]uilding control technology into new plants at time of construction will plainly be less costly than [sic] requiring retrofit when pollution control ceilings are reached." H.R.Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong.,

1st Sess. 185, *reprinted in* 1977 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 1264. But Congress did not permanently exempt existing plants from these requirements; section 7411(a)(2) provides that existing plants that have been modified are subject to the Clean Air Act programs at issue here. As Judge Boggs, dissenting in *National-Southwire*, reasoned: "The purpose of the 'modification' rule is to ensure that pollution control measures are undertaken when they can be most effective, at the time of new or modified construction. See 116 Cong.Rec. 32, 918. (remarks of Sen. Cooper), *reprinted in* 1 Senate Committee on Public Works, A Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (1974), at 260." *National-Southwire Aluminum Co. v. EPA*, 838 F.2d 835, 843 (6th Cir.) (Boggs, J., dissenting), *cert. denied*, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 390, 102 L.Ed.2d 379 (1988). Judge Boggs argued that the shutting down of pollution control equipment in an existing plant should not be considered a modification because it would not afford the utility an opportunity for "effective placement of new control technology." *Id.* Here the record is silent on this point (although the point is important). How easy or difficult would be "the effective placement of new control technology" in these renovated units is not clear, but we do know that the project already contemplates replacement of steam drums, air heaters and other components; each unit would, therefore, in any event be shut down for nine months.

Our reading of the phrase "any physical change" is also consistent with another of the basic goals of the 1977 Amendments: technology-forcing. The legislative history suggests and courts have recognized that in passing the Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress intended to stimulate the advancement of pollution control technology. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1970) ("Standards of performance should provide an incentive for industries to work toward constant improvement in techniques for preventing and controlling emissions from stationary sources...."); *Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA*, 698 F.2d 456, 475 (D.C.Cir.1983);

Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 372; *ASARCO*, 578 F.2d at 327; *United States v. SCM Corp.*, 667 F.Supp. 1110, 1126-27 (D.Md. 1987). The development of emissions control systems is not furthered if operators could, without exposure to the standards of the 1977 Amendments, increase production (and pollution) through the extensive replacement of deteriorated generating systems.

2. Increase in Emissions

The controversy involving WEPCO's alleged increase in emissions primarily concerns the regulations, not the statute: WEPCO argues that the EPA's regulatory method of measuring emissions is arbitrary and capricious. From a statutory standpoint, however, the modification provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments are activated once a physical change is coupled with an "increase[] [in] the amount of any air pollutant emitted." 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4). See, e.g., *United States v. Narragansett Improvement Co.*, 571 F.Supp. at 694. In the case before us, ~~WEPCO does not dispute that its replacement program—intended to enable its deteriorated generators to operate at full capacity—will cause its emissions to increase from their current operating levels.~~ The question for resolution, however, is whether the EPA properly construed its regulations by comparing actual emission rates with so-called "baseline" rates to determine the increase in emissions for NSPS and PSD purposes. We will discuss this subject later; but for purposes of the statutory requirement, we simply observe that the rejuvenated Port Washington plant will produce more emissions after the completion of the renovation project than the operating deteriorated plant produced shortly before the project was undertaken.

B. The EPA's Regulations

Although we have determined that WEPCO's repair and replacement program satisfies the modification provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments, this is not the end of our inquiry. WEPCO's attack focuses primarily on EPA regulations, which in a number of respects are narrower than

the statute. WEPCO argues that the EPA applied its regulations arbitrarily and capriciously to the Port Washington project.

1. Physical Change and the "Routine" Exception

EPA regulations define "modification" as "any physical or operational change to an existing facility which results in an increase in the emission rate to the atmosphere of any pollutant to which a standard applies." 40 C.F.R. § 60.14(a) (1988). To a major degree, this definition parallels 42 U.S.C. section 7411(a)(2), and it is unnecessary to repeat the analysis already applied to the statute. See *supra* III(A)(1). However, the EPA has, in addition, used its regulations to exempt a number of activities from the broader definition. The exemption that may be relevant here is accomplished by the following language:

The following shall not, by themselves, be considered modifications under this part:

(1) Maintenance, repair, and replacement which the Administrator determines to be routine for a source category. . . .

~~40 C.F.R. § 60.14(e) (1988). See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(iii).~~ WEPCO relies on this language to argue that, even if its repair and replacement program amounts to a physical change, it was specifically exempted by the regulations.

Again, we accord substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations, especially with respect to technical and complex matters. *Lyng v. Payne*, 476 U.S. 926, 939, 106 S.Ct. 2333, 2341, 90 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986); *Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist.*, 467 U.S. 380, 390, 104 S.Ct. 2472, 2479, 81 L.Ed.2d 301 (1984). In this connection, to determine whether proposed work at a facility is routine, "EPA makes a case-by-case determination by weighing the nature, extent, purpose, frequency, and cost of the work, as well as other relevant factors, to arrive at a common-sense finding." Clay Memorandum at 3. The EPA considered all these factors in determining that the Port Washington project was not

routine; first, the EPA observed that the nature and extent of the project was substantial: WEPCO proposed to replace sixty-foot steam drums (in units 2, 3, 4 and 5) and air heaters (in units 1, 2, 3 and 4) during successive nine-month outages at each unit. *Id.* at 4. Certainly, the magnitude of the project (as well as the downtime required to implement it) suggests that it is more than routine.

Further, the EPA points to WEPCO's admission in its application that "[work items] falling into the category of *repetitive maintenance that are normally performed* during scheduled equipment outages ... *are not included in this application.*" Cassidy Letter at 1 (emphasis supplied). This admission suggests that WEPCO at first blush did not regard the repair and replacement project as ordinary or routine.

In addition, the EPA noted that far from being routine, the Port Washington project apparently was unprecedented: "WEPCO did not identify, and EPA did not find, even a single instance of renovation work at any electric utility generating station that approached the Port Washington life extension project in nature, scope or extent." Respondent's Brief at 44; see Clay Memorandum at 4 ("[T]his is a highly unusual, if not unprecedented, and costly project."). We surmise, although the record is silent, that the "case of first impression" character of the project may reflect historical practice in the electric utility industry of replacing old plants (at the expiration of their useful lives) with new plants, employing improved technologies and achieving improved efficiencies. This was the typical practice, rather than the mere extension of life of existing plants through massive like-kind replacements. Cf. Clay Memorandum at 4 ("[The Port Washington project's] purpose is to completely rehabilitate aging power generating units whose capacity has

significantly deteriorated over a period of years, thereby restoring their original capacity and substantially extending the period of their utilization as an alternative to retiring them as they approach the end of their useful physical and economic life.").

[5] WEPCO asks us to overlook the factors outlined in the Clay Memorandum and reverse the EPA primarily on the basis of earlier EPA decisions characterizing certain replacement programs as routine; WEPCO argues that the nature and extent of these "routine" projects parallel those of its Port Washington project. For example, WEPCO presented the EPA with a list of forty air heaters in other plants that had been replaced without triggering NSPS or PSD provisions. Letter from Mark P. Steinberg, Superintendent—Air Quality of WEPCO, to Dale Ziege, Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (Jan. 11, 1989). But as WEPCO has acknowledged, the plate-type air heaters at issue in the Port Washington project must be replaced *in whole*; in contrast, the forty units where replacement was apparently considered routine contained a Ljungstrom basket or tubular type heater. The Ljungstrom basket type, at least, permits the replacement of the heat transfer surface without requiring the removal of the entire unit. Supplemental Determination at 6-7. Obviously, the precise nature of the physical change is a material factor in determining whether the change is routine, and for this purpose it is important that the subject of past EPA practice be closely comparable with the change under consideration here. See Thomas Letter at 3 ("PSD and NSPS applicability determinations are made on a case-by-case basis."). WEPCO has not demonstrated that the EPA's conclusion that the forty other air heater replacements were dissimilar is arbitrary and capricious.²

The purpose, frequency and cost of the work also support the EPA's decision here.

2. We similarly view supplemental evidence marshalled by WEPCO on this point. WEPCO argues that the EPA has treated the replacement of coal pulverizers and regenerator cyclones as routine; however, WEPCO fails to demonstrate the similarities between these units and the air heaters and steam drums at issue here. While it

is true that some repair and replacement programs are routine, it does not necessarily follow that all such programs are routine. Without more evidence, we are not convinced that the EPA's characterization of the massive Port Washington project as non-routine is inconsistent with its prior rulings.

WEPCO admits that the plans for extensive renovation "represent a *life extension* of the units from their *planned retirement dates*," Cassidy Letter at 2-3 (emphasis supplied), and it recognizes that "the renovation work items included in this application are those that would normally occur only once or twice during a unit's expected life cycle." *Id.* at 1. Indeed, WEPCO reported that it had never previously replaced a steam drum or "header" of comparable size at any of its coal-fired electrical generating facilities. Clay Memorandum at 5. Further, the Port Washington renovation project will cost at least \$70.5 million. Letter from John W. Boston, Senior Vice President of WEPCO, to Gary D. McCutchen, Chief New Source Review Section of the EPA, at 4 (May 19, 1988). These factors suggest that the project is not routine.

[6] WEPCO urges that the EPA's conclusions are supported by neither the evidence nor the provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments. WEPCO reasons that because *any* replacement project will presumably extend the life of a facility, the EPA's reliance on life extension as a factor in denying the "routine" nature of a project is overbroad. Petitioners' Brief at 44. Although perhaps persuasive on its face, WEPCO's analysis is ultimately wide of the mark. While it is certainly true that the repair of deteriorated equipment will contribute to the useful life of any facility, it does not necessarily follow that the repairs in question would extend the *life expectancy* of the facility. The need for some repairs along the line is a given in determining in the first instance the life expectancy of a plant. WEPCO cannot seriously argue that its units' planned retirement dates of 1992 (units 1 and 2) and 1999 (units 3, 4 and 5) did not take into account at least minor equipment repairs and replacements.³ And

3. By WEPCO's own admission, "even a new facility could not operate normally but for a relatively short period of time . . . [w]ithout any repair or replacement . . ." Petitioner's Brief at 44. Because the plants were placed into service between 1935 and 1950—and because WEPCO acknowledges that the life expectancy of these plants was approximately fifty years—it is clear that WEPCO included minor part repair and replacement in its calculations. Of course, the

WEPCO concedes that the Port Washington program will *extend* the life expectancy of the plant until 2010. The EPA concluded that the proposed project will increase the life expectancy of the Port Washington facility, and this conclusion was a factor in the finding that the work was not routine. These determinations were not arbitrary and capricious.

[7] Still, WEPCO asserts that the cost, magnitude and nature of its Port Washington project are irrelevant for purposes of the "routine" exception to NSPS and PSD. WEPCO contends that the EPA has already addressed these factors—including the perpetuation of existing sources—through its so-called "reconstruction" rule:

(a) An existing facility, upon reconstruction, becomes an affected facility [subject to NSPS], irrespective of any change in emission rate.

(b) "Reconstruction" means the replacement of components of an existing facility to such an extent that:

(1) The fixed capital cost of the new components exceeds 50 percent of the fixed capital cost that would be required to construct a comparable entirely new facility.

40 C.F.R. § 60.15 (1988).⁴ See United States Environmental Protection Agency, *Electric Utility Steam Generating Units: Background Information for Proposed Particulate Matter Emission Standards* 5-7 (1978). WEPCO believes that, because the air heater replacements will presumably cost less than six percent of a wholly new facility, the reconstruction provisions are not triggered. Therefore, WEPCO argues that the cost and scope of the project are relevant only to a "reconstruction" analysis and are not material for purposes of the routine exception to the modification provisions. Petitioner's Brief at 46.

planned retirement dates appear to be merely estimates and do not seem to be binding.

4. The reconstruction provisions of the regulations apply only to NSPS; given the existing regulatory framework, the EPA decided that they would not be necessary for PSD. See 45 Fed.Reg. 52676, 52703 (1980).

WEPCO's analysis fails to note, however, the fundamental differences distinguishing the reconstruction and modification provisions. The reconstruction provision applies to any substantial replacement (more than 50% of the cost of a new facility) *even if the replacement causes no subsequent increase in emissions*. In sharp contrast, the modification provisions apply only when a physical change is accompanied by *an increase in emissions*. To argue, therefore, that the reconstruction provision is the *exclusive* determinant of whether the cost, nature and magnitude of a project will require the application of NSPS is to ignore the substantially different objectives of the reconstruction and modification provisions: The reconstruction provision is aimed principally at "discourag[ing] the perpetuation of a facility, instead of replacing it at the end of its useful life with a newly constructed affected facility," *without regard to emissions*, 39 Fed.Reg. 36946, 36948 (1974), while the modification provision applies to *any* physical change, without regard to cost, that causes an increase in emissions. *See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. EPA*, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C.Cir.1978); *United States v. Narragansett Improvement Co.*, 571 F.Supp. 688, 695 (D.R.I.1983) ("a 'reconstruction' of an existing facility would occur 'irrespective of any change in emission rate' upon the replacement of a 'substantial portion of the existing facility's components.'"). Hence, we cannot agree that the EPA's consideration of the cost, magnitude and nature of the Port Washington project, for purposes of the modification provision of the regulations (and its "routine" exception), is somehow "preempted" by the reconstruction provisions of the regulations. The EPA's examination of these factors, therefore, was not arbitrary or capricious.

2. Increase in Emissions

Thus far, we have not had to address the important differences between the PSD and NSPS programs. At this point, how-

5. Of course, if the unit is currently operating at maximum design capacity, there will be no difference between the measure of emissions at maximum design capacity and at current maxi-

ever, the differences become crucial, because each program measures emissions in a fundamentally distinct manner.

a. NSPS Measurements

As previously noted, the EPA's NSPS program is concerned primarily with increases in emission rates, expressed in kilograms per hour of discharged pollutants. 40 C.F.R. § 60.14 (1988). The EPA compares the hourly emissions of the unit at its current maximum capacity to its potential emissions at maximum capacity after the change. Clay Memorandum at 9; *see* 40 C.F.R. § 60 App. C (1988) (providing complex formulae for determining emission rate change). In this calculation, the agency disregards the unit's maximum *design* capacity; this factor often sheds little light on the unit's *actual current* capacity to produce emissions.⁵

The EPA applied these procedures in examining the generating units at Port Washington. The EPA asked WEPCO to submit figures for the actual operations and emissions of each unit at the Port Washington plant for the years 1978 to 1987; the EPA then relied upon the 1987 figures to calculate the emissions baseline against which post-replacement emissions could be compared. WEPCO, however, challenged the EPA's acceptance of these preliminary baseline figures, arguing that units 1, 2, 3 and 4 were capable of operating at higher rates of production than those calculated by the EPA based upon the 1987 figures. WEPCO conducted five ten-hour tests at each unit to determine its maximum capacity. Upon reviewing the test results, the EPA agreed that units 2 and 3 could be operated at their design capacities, and it revised the baseline levels for these units. The agency concluded that because there would be no increase in production or emissions, NSPS would not apply to these units following the renovation project. Nonetheless, the EPA refused to alter the baseline levels for units 1 and 4, noting that

Since the units at Port Washington were operating well below maximum design capacity (and unit 5 was completely shut down), that is not the case here.

WEPCO's tests had not been conducted pursuant to the test protocol as required by the regulations and the Wisconsin State Implementation Plan (units 1 and 4 exceeded certain maximum allowable emission limits). Supplemental Determination at 8-9. Comparing these 1987 baseline levels to the maximum capacity of the plant after renovation, the EPA concluded that the renovation project would be subject to the provisions of NSPS.

WEPCO asks us to overturn the EPA's final ruling that the Port Washington project triggers NSPS. Specifically, WEPCO argues that, by using 1987 figures in determining the emissions baseline, the EPA failed to apply its own regulations: WEPCO asserts that these figures "reflected voluntary decisions by WEPCO regarding safety considerations (e.g., the 'zero' rate for Unit 5) and an electricity demand which did not require operation of the units at higher capacities." Petitioner's Brief at 15-16. WEPCO also posits that the EPA's refusal to compare *representative* pre-renovation emissions with *actual* post-renovation emissions is contrary

to EPA regulations and amounts to an abuse of agency discretion.⁶

[8] WEPCO's first assertion is easily dismissed. The EPA's choice of the 1987 figures was based entirely upon WEPCO's own data. And, when WEPCO complained that its own data did not reflect WEPCO's pre-renovation capabilities, the EPA permitted WEPCO to conduct new tests (pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 60 App. C (1988)) that eventually resulted in the revision of the baselines for units 2 and 3.

[9,10] WEPCO's second charge is far more substantial. WEPCO argues that NSPS regulations require the EPA to use a "representative" year in determining a baseline rate of emissions. The EPA disputes this claim, arguing that "[a]s to NSPS, there is no 'representative emissions' concept.... Rather... the baseline emission rates for units 1-5 are determined by hourly maximum capacity just prior to the renovations."⁷ Thomas Letter at 5.

WEPCO's interpretation of the regulations, at first blush, seems sensible: since the regulations require that the manual

6. As a preliminary matter, we note that WEPCO has not asked us to review the propriety of the NSPS regulations themselves. Indeed, we have no jurisdiction to conduct such an inquiry: 42 U.S.C. section 7607(b)(1) reserves such questions for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In this case, WEPCO simply requests that we consider whether the EPA properly applied these regulations to the Port Washington generating units. We have jurisdiction to undertake such an inquiry. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).

7. The regulations themselves provide, in part:

(a) ... any physical or operational change to an existing facility which results in an increase in the emission rate to the atmosphere of any pollutant to which a standard applies shall be considered a modification...

(b) Emission rate shall be expressed as kg/hr of any pollutant discharged into the atmosphere for which a standard is applicable. The Administrator shall use the following to determine the emission rate:

(1) Emission factors as specified in the latest issue of "Compilation of Air Pollutant Emission Factors," EPA Publication No. AP-42, or other emission factors determined by the Administrator to be superior to AP-42 emission factors, in cases where utilization of emission factors demonstrate that the emis-

sion level resulting from the physical or operational change will either clearly increase or clearly not increase.

(2) Material balances, continuous monitor data, or manual emission tests in cases where utilization of emission factors as referenced in paragraph (b)(1) of this section does not demonstrate to the Administrator's satisfaction whether the emission level resulting from the physical or operational change will either clearly increase or clearly not increase, or where an owner or operator demonstrates to the Administrator's satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds to dispute the result obtained by the Administrator utilizing emission factors as referenced in paragraph (b)(1) of this section. When the emission rate is based on results from manual emission tests or continuous monitoring systems, the procedures specified in Appendix C of this part shall be used to determine whether an increase in emission rate has occurred. Tests shall be conducted under such conditions as the Administrator shall specify to the owner or operator based on representative performance of the facility. At least three valid test runs must be conducted before and at least three after the physical or operational change. All operating parameters which may affect emissions must be held constant to the maximum feasible degree for all test runs.

emission tests and continuous monitoring systems be based upon the "representative performance" of the facility, the emission factor test approach must also be based upon "representative performance." 40 C.F.R. § 60.14 (1988); see 39 Fed.Reg. 36946, 36947 (1974) (explaining provision).⁸ Otherwise, the tests might reach inconsistent results, making the rate of emissions entirely dependent upon the type of test used by the facility. Hence, argues WEPCO, the EPA must examine the emission rates during a representative period, not 1987.

WEPCO's analysis, however, relies upon a flawed premise. WEPCO assumes that the phrase "representative performance of the facility" suggests that the EPA must choose a representative year. Read in context, however, the phrase refers generally to all the *conditions of the test*, not specifically to its timing:

Tests shall be conducted under such conditions as the Administrator shall specify to the owner or operator based on representative performance of the facility. At least three valid test runs must be conducted before and at least three after the physical or operational change. All operating parameters which may affect emissions must be held constant to the maximum feasible degree for all test runs.

40 C.F.R. § 60.14(b)(2) (1988). Compare 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(21)(ii) (1988) (PSD program) ("The Administrator shall allow the use of a *different time period* upon a determination that it is more representative of normal source operation.") (emphasis supplied). Put simply, section 60.14 ensures that the operator will not doctor test-

40 C.F.R. § 60.14 (1988).

8. The emission factor test is the only technique that can *predict* emission rates after renovations. Because the determination at issue here must be made before the renovations are undertaken, the EPA relied on this test in evaluating the Port Washington project.

9. WEPCO does assert that the EPA improperly examined only the lowest hourly capacity achieved during the test periods. Even if the EPA had accepted the highest capacity tests, however, the rate of emissions of units 1, 4 and 5 still would have subjected those units to NSPS after the renovation. Further, the EPA ac-

ing conditions to produce favorable emission results. The EPA's explanation of its regulations, which of course is given deference, supports this interpretation: "According to the proposed regulation, each set of emission tests (using manual tests or continuous monitors) conducted before and after a physical or operational change would consist of at least three runs, *and would be conducted under representative operating conditions.*" 39 Fed.Reg. 36946, 36947 (1974) (emphasis supplied). WEPCO has not argued that it conducted its own tests under unrepresentative conditions, nor has it challenged any other part of the test protocol.⁹ And WEPCO does not claim that the tests were conducted during a period of operations that substantially differed from the normal operations of the deteriorated Port Washington plant. Further, the fact that the EPA permitted WEPCO to conduct additional emissions tests on the units (during which, presumably, WEPCO could maintain representative operating conditions) undermines WEPCO's assertion that the regulations were applied arbitrarily or capriciously.

b. PSD Measurements

Unlike NSPS, PSD is concerned with changes in *total annual emissions*, expressed in tons per year. The PSD regulations require preconstruction review of the construction or modification of major emitting facilities. These regulations define their key term—"major modification"—as "any physical change in or change in the method of operation of a major stationary source that would result in a significant¹⁰ net emissions increase of any pollutant subject to regulation under the Act." 40

knowledges that there will be no difference between the rate of emissions of units 2 and 3 before and after the renovation, regardless of the chosen capacity level. See Letter from Walt Stevenson to Jack Farmer (Jan. 5, 1989) (summarizing Port Washington capacity tests). We therefore need not consider whether the Administrator may rely upon the lowest capacity level.

10. The regulations define "significant" in terms of threshold emissions increases of individual pollutants: for example, an increase of 40 tons per year of nitrogen oxides is a "significant" net emissions increase. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(23) (1988).

C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(i) (1988) (footnote supplied).

Here the question is whether WEPCO's renovation project will result in "a significant net emissions increase" so as to trigger the "major modification" provision of the regulations and, as a result, PSD. To determine whether the project would result in an emissions increase, the EPA compared actual pre-renovation emissions with potential post-renovation emissions at the Port Washington plant. Specifically, the EPA first examined the two-year period of 1983 through 1984 as the pre-renovation baseline period, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. section 52.21(b)(21)(ii):

In general, actual emissions as of a particular date shall equal the average rate, in tons per year, at which the unit actually emitted the pollutant during a *two-year period which precedes the particular date and which is representative of normal source operation. The Administrator shall allow the use of a different time period upon a determination that it is more representative of normal source operation.* Actual emissions shall be calculated using the unit's actual operating hours, production rates, and types of materials processed, stored, or combusted during the selected time period.

40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(21)(ii) (1988) (emphasis supplied). Because Administrator Thomas determined that the discovery of cracks in the rear steam drums led to a more recent "source curtailment," he relied upon the data from earlier years, 1983 and 1984, as the baseline to determine whether the renovation would cause an increase in emissions. Thomas Letter at 5. WEPCO does not challenge this component of the EPA's calculation.

Second, the EPA calculated the actual emissions of the plant *following* completion of the project. Generally, in order to apply PSD, the regulations require the EPA to

11. Despite WEPCO's protestations, we note initially that the EPA's refusal to apply the "production rate/hours of operation" exclusion was proper. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(iii)(f) (1988). This exclusion—which states that "[a] physical change or change in the method of operation

find an "increase in *actual emissions* from a particular physical change or change in method of operation." 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(3)(i)(a) (1988) (emphasis supplied). The EPA reasoned, however, that because the source "ha[d] not yet begun operations following the renovation, 'actual emissions' following the renovation [were] deemed to be the source's 'potential to emit.'" Clay Memorandum at 7. In support of its reliance on WEPCO's potential to emit, the EPA pointed to the regulations: "For any emissions unit which has not begun normal operations on the particular date, actual emissions shall equal the potential to emit of the unit on that date." 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(21)(iv) (1988).

[11] WEPCO objects strenuously, and with good reason. In calculating the plant's post-renovation potential to emit, the EPA bases its figures on round-the-clock operations (24 hours per day, 365 days per year) because WEPCO *could potentially* operate its facility continuously, despite the fact that WEPCO has never ~~done-so-in-the-past.~~ And the EPA has admitted that it "assumed that emissions increases at Port Washington would come not from an increase in emission rate, but rather from increases in production rate or hours of operation." Supplemental Determination at 9; *see* Clay Memorandum at 7-8. The EPA responds that WEPCO can avoid these maximum calculations simply by consenting to federally enforceable restrictions on production rates and hours of operation, but WEPCO declines to do so. Clay Memorandum at 8; *see* 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.21(b)(4), 52.21(b)(16) (1988). Thus, argues the EPA, it has no choice but to assume that the plant will be operated continuously.¹¹

[12] The first issue to be addressed is whether the EPA properly invoked the "potential to emit" concept in calculating the emissions increase. As explained above,

shall not include ... [a]n increase in the hours of operation or in the production rate," *id.*—was provided to allow facilities to take advantage of *fluctuating market conditions*, not construction or modification activity. *See* 45 Fed.Reg. 52676, 52704 (1980).

Cite as 893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990)

the PSD regulations state that the EPA may rely upon a facility's potential to emit if the unit "has not *begun normal operations* on the particular date." 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(21)(iv) (1988) (emphasis supplied). WEPCO argues that this phrase should be interpreted to include only those units that have never been in operation, while the EPA urges that the phrase can be applied to both new and modified units.

The regulatory history of this phrase sheds little light on its proper interpretation. The EPA argues that it has always interpreted this phrase to include modified units; it asserts that its formulae for determining emissions increases have consistently assumed that "new or *modified units*" would be deemed to operate at maximum physical or federally enforceable levels. 45 Fed.Reg. 52676, 52718 (1980) (emphasis supplied). But the EPA's analysis here seems circular: in order to demonstrate that the Port Washington like-kind replacement project constitutes a modification, the EPA applies the potential to emit concept (to show an increase in emissions). And in order to apply the potential to emit concept to like-kind replacement, the EPA assumes that the plant is a "modified" unit. Although we accord great deference to an agency construing the statute it administers, *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. at 2782, and even more deference to an agency interpreting its own complex regulations, *Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist.*, 467 U.S. at

12. In a supplemental filing pursuant to Seventh Circuit Rule 28(j), the EPA intimates that the First Circuit's recent decision in *Puerto Rican Cement Co. v. EPA*, 889 F.2d 292 (1st Cir.1989), permits the use of the potential to emit concept in similar circumstances. However, unlike the case at issue here, *Puerto Rican Cement* involved the construction of a new emissions unit at an existing source. Further, the First Circuit distinguished its holding from controversies having something in common with the one before us.

One can imagine circumstances that might test the reasonableness of EPA's regulation. An electricity company, for example, might wish to replace a peak load generator—one that operates only a few days per year—with a new peak load generator that the firm could, but almost certainly will not, operate every day.... Whatever the arguments about the "irrationality" of EPA's interpretation in such

390, 104 S.Ct. at 2479, we cannot defer to agency interpretations that, as applied here, appear to assume what they seek to prove.¹²

[13,14] We are also troubled by the EPA's assumption of continuous operations in calculating potential to emit at the Port Washington plant. Although we agree that the EPA cannot reasonably rely on a utility's own unenforceable estimates of its annual emissions,¹³ we find no support in the regulations for the EPA's decision wholly to disregard past operating conditions at the plant. Indeed, *Alabama Power Co. v. Costle*, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C.Cir. 1979), which contributes importantly to the EPA's current PSD program, suggests otherwise. There, the D.C. Circuit held, in part, that the EPA must "take[] into account the anticipated functioning of the air pollution control equipment designed into the facility" when calculating the facility's potential to emit. *Id.* at 353. More important for our purposes, however, was the court's discussion of a unit's potential to emit:

If the source has no actual emissions because it has yet to commence operating, its hypothetical, projected emissions are included in the baseline. *If, however, the source is an established operation, a more realistic assessment of its impact on ambient air quality levels is possible, and thus is directed.*

circumstances, however, those circumstances are not present here.

Id. at 297-98.

13. The EPA argues that WEPCO can avoid the presumption of continuous operations simply by consenting to federally enforceable emission limits. However, the EPA has not brought to our attention a clear regulatory basis for its conclusion that the provision of this alternative justifies the assumption of continuous operation if the utility refuses to consent. And WEPCO may have legitimate reasons for declining to submit to federally enforceable emission limits: "[U]ncertainties about the the precise shape of future electricity peak demand might make the firm hesitate to promise EPA it will *never* increase actual emissions...." *Puerto Rican Cement Co. v. EPA*, 889 F.2d 292, 298 (1st Cir. 1989).

Id. at 379 (emphasis supplied). The district court in *United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp.*, 682 F.Supp. 1141 (D.Colo.1988), relying on *Alabama Power*, recently reached the same conclusion:

The broad holding of *Alabama Power* is that potential to emit does not refer to the maximum emissions that can be generated by a source hypothesizing the worst conceivable operation. Rather, the concept contemplates the maximum emissions that can be generated while operating the source as it is intended to be operated and as it is normally operated. Of course, it is possible that a source could be operated without the control equipment designed into it or that a Konus heater could be operated so badly that the fire would go out. Yet, *Alabama Power* stands for the proposition that hypothesizing the worst possible emissions from the worst possible operation is the wrong way to calculate potential to emit.

Id. at 1158.

In sum, we certainly do not suggest that the EPA may never subject replaced units to the potential to emit concept under its regulations. The EPA may, if it wishes, undertake notice and comment procedures to apply the potential to emit concept to like-kind replacement. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d). But existing regulations do not seem to us to support such an application. We therefore believe that the EPA's reliance on an assumed continuous operation as a basis for finding an emissions increase is not properly supported. The EPA's determination that there has been a major modification for PSD purposes must be set aside.¹⁴

IV. Fuel Switching

[15] The final significant dispute in this case involves fuel switching. WEPSCO proposed to the EPA that its "replacement project combined with an enforceable fuel

14. It appears that WEPSCO never submitted pollutant-specific data to the EPA. Clay Memorandum at 7-8. Consequently, the EPA could not, at the time the matter was before it, conclude whether the renovated plant would cause a significant net emissions increase if it were operat-

switch would not 'result[] in an increase in the [sulfur dioxide and particulate matter] emission rate[s]' from those units." Petitioner's Brief at 50 (brackets in original); see 40 C.F.R. § 60.14(a) (1988). Nonetheless, the EPA refused to permit WEPSCO to utilize lower sulfur coal instead of implementing pollution control technologies to prevent an increase in emissions. The EPA explained that "the statute reflects a basic political decision that fossil fuel-fired sources not rely only on natural occurring less-polluting fuels to comply with the NSPS. Instead, Congress declared that compliance must depend in part upon the application of flue gas treatment or other pollution control technologies." Supplemental Determination at 10. Further, the EPA pointed to 40 C.F.R. section 60.14(b)(2) (1988), which requires that "operating parameters"—including fuel and raw materials—must be held constant in measuring emissions before and after renovations to determine whether the utility has undertaken a modification. WEPSCO disputes the EPA's interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments.

Consistent with the Supreme Court's approach in *Chevron*, we first examine whether the statute evinces a clear congressional intent on the matter. We believe it does. Although the plain language of 42 U.S.C. section 7411 does not resolve the issue, the relevant legislative history provides ample support for the EPA's position. The House Conference Report, for example, states:

The agreement requires (1) that the standards of performance for fossil fuel-fired boilers be substantially upgraded to require the use of the best technological system of continuous emission reduction and to preclude use of untreated low sulfur coal alone as a means of compliance; ... (3) that for fossil fuel-fired sources, the new source performance

ed under present hours and conditions. WEPSCO should make such data available so that the EPA can determine on that basis whether the Port Washington plant will be subject to the PSD program.

standards must be comprised of both a standard of performance for emissions and an enforceable requirement for a percentage reduction in pollution from untreated fuel.

H.R.Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 130, *reprinted in* 1977 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1077, 1510 (emphasis supplied). In addition, passages from the congressional debates reflect Congress's refusal to allow stationary sources to substitute low sulfur fuels to avoid a requirement of pollution control technology. *See, e.g.,* III Senate Committee on Environment & Public Works, *A Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977*, at 323, 353 (1978) (disapproving substitution of low sulfur coal for pollution control technology); IV Senate Committee on Environment & Public Works, *supra*, at 2653 (same). In these reports, Congress reasoned that the Administrator's *previous* standards—which had allowed fuel switching in lieu of pollution control technology—directly conflicted with the purposes of the NSPS program:

1. The standards give a competitive advantage to those States with cheaper low-sulfur coal and create a disadvantage for Midwestern and Eastern States where predominantly higher sulfur coals are available;

2. These standards do not provide for maximum practicable emission reduction using locally available fuels, and therefore do not maximize potential for long-term growth;

3. These standards do not help to expand the energy resources (that is, higher sulfur coal) that could be burned in compliance with emission limits as intended;

4. These standards aggravate compliance problems for existing coal-burning stationary sources which cannot retrofit and which must compete with larger, new sources for low-sulfur coal;

5. These standards increase the risk of early plant shutdowns by existing plants (for the reasons stated above), with greater risk of unemployment; and

6. These standards operate as a disincentive to the improvement of technology

893 F.2d—22

of new sources, since untreated fuels could be burned instead of using such new, more effective technology.

III Senate Committee on Environment & Public Works, *supra*, at 323. These purposes, reflecting technological and political choices, demonstrate that Congress rejected fuel switching as a method of avoiding the impact of NSPS. We believe Congress left us no choice on this issue.

V. CONCLUSION

In an era of increasing environmental concern, Congress enacted the Clean Air Act to "speed up, expand, and intensify the war against air pollution in the United States with a view to assuring that the air we breathe throughout the Nation is wholesome once again." H.R.Rep. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 1, 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5356, 5356. The EPA is entitled to substantial deference in interpreting the technical provisions of the Act and its own regulations. We cannot grant deference, however, where the EPA has attempted to implement the Act's lofty goals in contravention of its own statutory regime. We therefore affirm in part and vacate in part, remanding the cause to the EPA for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.



Juan VILLEGAS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Cross-Appellant,

v.

PRINCETON FARMS, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellant,
Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 89-1632, 89-1850.

United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.

Argued Dec. 1, 1989.

Decided Jan. 22, 1990.

Employee brought suit against former employer alleging that he was fired for his